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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
The stakes in removal proceedings—whether a 
noncitizen2 will be deported—could hardly be higher.  But 
despite the high stakes, the outcomes of these proceedings 
sometimes turn on minutiae.  Small inconsistencies in a 
noncitizen’s testimony can doom even those cases that might 
otherwise warrant relief.  To ensure testimony is not unfairly 
characterized as inconsistent, a noncitizen must be able to 
communicate effectively with the officials deciding his case.  
Because language barriers can make effective communication 
impossible, our Court has long recognized the importance of a 
competent interpreter to ensure the fairness of proceedings to 
individuals who do not speak English.  But what happens if an 
immigration official does not make a meaningful effort to 
determine whether a noncitizen has limited proficiency in 
English?   
 
 Our case exemplifies this problem.  Petitioner B.C., a 
native of Cameroon, primarily speaks “Pidgin” English, and 
reports that he has only limited abilities in the “Standard” 
English in which we write this opinion.  He fled from 
Cameroon to the United States after allegedly facing 
 
2 We use the term “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory 
term “alien.”  See Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1446 n.2 
(2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)). 
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persecution at the hands of his government.  Soon after his 
arrival, the United States Department of Homeland Security 
began removal proceedings against B.C., and he applied for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  In a series of interviews 
and hearings, immigration officials either presumed he spoke 
“Standard” English or gave him an unhelpful, binary choice 
between “English or Spanish” or “English or French.”  And 
despite persistent clues that he was less than fluent in 
“Standard” English, he was left to fend for himself in that 
language without an interpreter.  The record shows this 
resulted in confusion and misunderstanding.  Relying on 
purported “inconsistencies” in the statements B.C. made 
without the help of an interpreter, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
denied his applications on the ground that he was not credible, 
and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed.  
When presented with additional country conditions evidence, 
expert reports on the linguistic differences between “Standard” 
and “Pidgin” English, and B.C.’s card showing membership in 
an allegedly persecuted group, the BIA denied his motion to 
reopen.   
 
 We hold that B.C. was denied due process because the 
IJ did not conduct an adequate initial evaluation of whether an 
interpreter was needed and took no action even after the 
language barrier became apparent.  Those failures resulted in a 
muddled record and appear to have impermissibly colored the 
agency’s adverse credibility determination.  We therefore 
vacate the BIA’s decisions and remand for a new hearing on 
the merits of B.C.’s claims.  On remand, the agency must also 
remedy other errors B.C. has identified, which include dealing 






A. “Standard” English vs. “Pidgin” English 
 
Because the question of law in this appeal ultimately 
turns on B.C.’s particular English language abilities, we begin 
by examining the differences between “Standard” and “Pidgin” 
English.  These observations are drawn from the reports of two 
linguistic experts submitted as exhibits to B.C.’s motion to 
reopen. 
 
It is undisputed that the primary language spoken in 
B.C.’s childhood home was “Cameroonian Pidgin English,”3 
which is derived from “Standard” English4 but has evolved into 
a “distinctly separate language . . . with its own grammatical 
and linguistic structure.”  A.R. at 102.  Take, for example, the 
following sentence in “Standard” English: “[I]f it were me,” “I 
would not let him come and visit the children.”  A.R. at 89.  
Translated into “Pidgin” English, this sentence would read, “If 
na mi, a no go gri meik I kam visit dat pikin dem.”  Id.  Setting 
aside the various ways in which the “Pidgin” English sentence 
might be unintelligible to the “Standard” English speaker (and 
vice versa), a listener is likely to misunderstand key phrases 
without proper translation.  Translated into “Pidgin” English, 
“if it were me” becomes “if na mi,” which a “Standard” English 
speaker could take to mean “if not me.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
3 In addition to “Pidgin” English, B.C. speaks the Akum 
language.  He also received some instruction in French during 
secondary school, though it is not clear how fluent he is in that 
language. 




Although “Pidgin” English speakers “may understand 
their language to be ‘a version’ of [‘Standard’] English,” a 
person who is proficient in “Pidgin” English is not 
automatically proficient in “Standard” English.  A.R. at 90.  
Instead, a “Pidgin” English speaker who wishes to 
communicate in “Standard” English must learn it as a second 
language.  Id.  B.C. did not have the benefit of a full education 
in “Standard” English; he learned some “Standard” English in 
his village primary school but was given no further “Standard” 
English instruction thereafter and asserts he was not proficient 
in that language when he entered the United States. 
 
B. B.C.’s Alleged Persecution in Cameroon 
 
Speakers of “Pidgin” English, like B.C., are considered 
“Anglophones” in Cameroon.  He reports that Francophones, 
including the predominantly Francophone Cameroonian 
government, “do not accept Anglophones in the community 
and treat them as second-class citizens.”  A.R. at 238, 348, 440.  
B.C. claims he was subjected to particularly egregious 
mistreatment because he was a supporter of an opposition party 
called the Social Democratic Front (“SDF”) and a member of 
the Southern Cameroon National Council (“SCNC”), a non-
violent political group that advocates for independence from 
Francophones.  B.C. reports that the Cameroonian government 
arrested and detained him twice as a result of his support for 
these groups.  More gravely, he claims military officers shot 
and killed his brother at an SCNC demonstration.  With the 
help of family friends, B.C. managed to escape the country, 






C. Initial Interactions with Immigration Officials 
 
Upon entry, officers of the United States Customs and 
Border Protection (“Customs”) interviewed B.C. and seized his 
documents.  Among those documents was a card listing him as 
a member of the SCNC.  As a result of the interview, Customs 
determined he was subject to removal and placed him in 
detention.  No interpreter was provided during this interview, 
and, as B.C. reported, he therefore “did [his] best with [his] 
limited [‘Standard’] English.”  A.R. at 123.  When he 
expressed a fear of returning to Cameroon, the Customs officer 
referred him for a credible fear interview, which is a threshold 
proceeding conducted by an asylum officer from the United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) to 
determine whether a case should be referred to an IJ for a full 
hearing.   
 
About three weeks later, B.C. attended his credible fear 
interview.  Again, no interpreter was provided.  B.C. reports 
that, “[a]lthough [he] did not always understand everything 
[he] was asked,” he “did [his] best to use . . . [‘]Standard[’] 
English” during the interview.  Id.  The asylum officer 
determined B.C. had established the requisite credible fear and 
referred his case to an IJ.  Throughout this period and in 
preparation for his appearance before the IJ, B.C. asked the 
Government to return his SCNC membership card numerous 
times, but the Government failed to do so and he was unable to 
get the card back for more than a year. 
 
D. Appearances before the IJ 
 
B.C. subsequently made multiple appearances before 
the IJ.  Because the IJ’s approach to the language issue varied 
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by hearing, we describe the events of each hearing in detail.  
Notably, over the course of these proceedings, B.C. (who was 
appearing pro se) was not once asked to identify in his own 
words the languages he speaks or offered a “Pidgin” English 
interpreter. 
 
1. First Appearance 
 
B.C. first appeared before the IJ in March 2018.  The 
scene was passing strange: Due to a “scrivener’s error,” B.C.’s 
Notice to Appear erroneously stated that he was a citizen of 
Guatemala.  A.R. at 438.  He therefore found himself at a 
preliminary group hearing with noncitizens who primarily 
spoke Spanish and where the only available interpreter was a 
Spanish speaker.  When the IJ turned to B.C., he did not ask 
what languages B.C. spoke, but instead gave him a simple 
choice between two languages: “Spanish or English?”  A.R. at 
460.  Having no other option, B.C. chose English.  Id.  In 
“Standard” English and with a Spanish interpreter, the IJ then 
explained the removal process to the group. 
 
2. Second Appearance 
 
A few days later, B.C. appeared before the IJ again for 
an individual hearing.  The IJ opened the hearing by 
introducing a Spanish interpreter without asking whether B.C. 
spoke that language.  Because B.C. is not a Spanish speaker, 
he interjected with one word: “English.”  Id.  The IJ did not 
inquire about what type of English B.C. spoke, instead asking 
him preliminary questions in “Standard” English and clarifying 
that he was not in fact a citizen of Guatemala.  In the middle of 
the proceeding, the IJ asked B.C., “Do you need a French 
interpreter or are you okay with the English?”  A.R. at 480.  
11 
 
B.C. responded that he was “okay in English.”  Id.  The IJ later 
asked if B.C. “read and underst[ood] French and English,” to 
which B.C. responded, “I read and understand English and 
French, a little bit.”  A.R. at 484–85.   
 
In response to the IJ’s substantive questions, B.C. 
admitted that he entered the United States without the 
appropriate documentation.  The IJ therefore sustained the 
removability charge.  B.C. then filed applications for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, which 
he later supplemented with various supporting documents, 
including his brother’s Cameroonian death certificate, 
evidence of country conditions in Cameroon, and statements 
from friends corroborating the circumstances of his brother’s 
death.  
 
3. Merits Hearing 
 
For months after these preliminary hearings, B.C. 
remained in detention and attempted to improve his “Standard” 
English.  In July 2018, the IJ convened a merits hearing.  B.C. 
again appeared pro se.  The IJ asked him a series of questions 
without first inquiring whether he needed an interpreter and 
instead asking only whether he was an “English speaker” or an 
“Anglophone.”  A.R. at 526, 531, 543.  The hearing transcript 
suggests there was a language barrier between B.C. and the IJ.  
For example, at least 36 separate times the transcript records 
B.C.’s testimony as “indiscernible,” meaning the court reporter 
was unable to decipher what he was saying.  And the IJ 
frequently interrupted B.C. to criticize him for sounding 





After the questioning concluded, the IJ and B.C. had a 
lengthy discussion demonstrating the IJ’s failure to appreciate 
the distinction between “Standard” and “Pidgin” English.  We 
reproduce portions of the conversation below to illustrate the 
depth of the misunderstanding between the two: 
 
[Judge:] When we first started off, I have to tell you 
something, you were running like a train out of the 
station. Almost like you memorized something and I 
couldn’t . . . understand what was going on because it 
was very stilted.  And I’m trying to be as understanding 
as possible but there are some inconsistencies from 
what the Asylum Officer said . . . . 
[B.C.:] Your Honor, maybe it was the language because 
-- 
[Judge:] You speak English. I speak English. 
[B.C.:] Yes, my English wasn’t fluent [during the 
interview with the asylum officer]. I speak, it wasn’t 
really coming out. But now I practice a lot . . . . 
[Judge:] . . . . [W]hy would you have to practice English 
if your mom and your family spoke English at home? 
[B.C.:] I started English just in primary school. Going 
to secondary school, we have just French. 
[Judge:] But what did your parents speak? 
[B.C.:] Huh. 
[Judge:] What did your mom and dad speak? 
[B.C.:] They speak our local language. 
[Judge:] What is it? 
[B.C.:] That’s Pidgin. 
[Judge:] Pidgin English. 
[B.C.:] Pidgin English, yes. 
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[Judge:] Well, I know Pidgin English5 . . . . Why did you 
have to practice English? 
[B.C.:] Huh? 
[Judge:] Why would you have to practice English if 
that’s your native language? 
[B.C.:] Your Honor, when I went to secondary school    
. . . . 
[Judge:] . . . . But when did you start secondary school? 
How old were you? 
[B.C.:] . . . . I was already 13 years old. 
[Judge:] Right. So you had spent 13 years of your life 
speaking English, right? 
[B.C.:] Yes. 
[Judge:] So you wouldn’t need to relearn it at your age 
. . . . 
[B.C.:] I go to school and come back home, it’s just 
Pidgin only used in the house. 
[Judge:] I don’t know about that. I don’t know if you 
need to learn English. 
 
A.R. at 588–91. 
 
 
5 Although the IJ asserted that he “kn[ew] [‘]Pidgin[’] 
English,” the record belies this contention.  There is no 
indication from the transcript that the IJ made an effort to speak 
to B.C. in any language other than “Standard” English.  The 
IJ’s suggestion that he spoke “Pidgin” English therefore seems 
to underscore the extent of his misunderstanding about what 
“Pidgin” English is. 
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4. The IJ’s Decision 
 
The IJ subsequently denied all relief and ordered B.C 
removed.  His decision rested solely on the conclusion that 
B.C. did not testify credibly and thus the IJ did not reach the 
merits of B.C.’s claims.  The IJ was primarily concerned with 
“inconsistencies” between B.C.’s representations to the asylum 
officer and testimony at the merits hearing, and with his 
demeanor at the merits hearing.  Again failing to acknowledge 
the distinction between “Standard” and “Pidgin” English, the 
IJ found B.C.’s “explanations regarding any language issues 
with the asylum officer inadequate and unconvincing, given his 
claim that he is an English speaker and the questions were 
simple and asked multiple times.”  A.R. at 446.  Finally, 
although the IJ had previously acknowledged that members of 
the SCNC and SDF may face persecution in Cameroon, he 
suggested it was troubling that B.C. “did not submit evidence 
of his membership” in either organization.  A.R. at 444.  
Notably, the IJ did not mention that the reason B.C. lacked this 
evidence was because the Government had confiscated his 
SCNC membership card and failed to give it back in time for 
the hearing.  Nor did the IJ substantively discuss or credit any 
of the other documents that B.C. provided in support of his 
application.   
 
5. Proceedings before the BIA 
 
B.C. appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ violated 
his right to due process by neglecting to ascertain the languages 
he speaks proficiently or provide an interpreter, made an 
unsupported adverse credibility determination, and failed to 
consider his documentary evidence.  The BIA dismissed the 
appeal because it was “unpersuaded . . . that [B.C.’s] English 
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was limited enough to trigger” the need for language 
assistance.  A.R. at 342.  The BIA also concluded the IJ’s 
adverse credibility finding was not clearly erroneous because 
it was supported by numerous inconsistencies in the record.  Id.  
Although the IJ failed to discuss specifically the documentary 
evidence supporting B.C.’s application, the BIA decided this 
was not an error because the IJ made a blanket statement that 
“all evidence not mentioned was fully considered.”  A.R. at 
343.   
 
After the BIA’s decision, and with the assistance of 
counsel, B.C. was finally able to get his SCNC membership 
card back from the Government.  Based in part on this 
evidence, B.C. moved for reconsideration and reopening of his 
case, which the BIA denied.  B.C. petitioned us for review of 
the BIA’s initial decision and its denial of the motion for 
reconsideration.  We consolidated the petitions and granted a 
stay of removal.   
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The BIA’s jurisdiction arose under 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1003.2.  We have jurisdiction under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252 to review the BIA’s decision, and we review the 
IJ’s decision to the extent the BIA “substantially relied on that 
opinion.”  Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 
2009), as amended (Nov. 4, 2009).  We review legal questions 
anew, Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 213 (3d 
Cir. 2017), factual determinations and findings of credibility 
for substantial evidence, Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 
197, 202 (3d Cir. 2011), and the denial of a motion to 
reconsider or reopen for abuse of discretion, Serrano-Alberto, 





The BIA did not evaluate, and we have no occasion to 
review, the merits of B.C.’s claims for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and relief under the CAT.  Instead, we are primarily 
asked to determine whether the proceedings were “conducted 
in a fair enough fashion for one to determine that the BIA’s 
decision was based on reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence.”  Cham v. Att’y Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 693 (3d Cir. 
2006) (citation omitted).  We conclude they were not. 
 
A. Due Process 
 
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to 
noncitizens in the United States.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678, 693 (2001).  “[A]s a matter of due process,” B.C. deserves 
“a full and fair hearing on his application[s]” for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT.  Cham, 445 
F.3d at 691.  There are three pillars of a fair hearing: (1) the IJ 
engages in fact-finding based on the record made at a hearing 
and disclosed to the noncitizen; (2) the noncitizen has the 
opportunity to make arguments and present evidence on his/her 
own behalf; and (3) the IJ makes an individualized 
determination of the noncitizen’s claims.  Chong v. Dist. Dir., 
I.N.S., 264 F.3d 378, 386 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
For two reasons, we hold the second pillar was not 
satisfied here.  First, at the beginning of the removal process, 
the IJ did not take adequate steps to evaluate whether B.C. 
needed an interpreter.  And second, as the merits hearing 
proceeded, the IJ failed to identify that an interpreter might be 
needed, even though there was ample evidence that B.C. might 
not be sufficiently proficient in “Standard” English.  This had 
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the potential to, and likely did, affect the outcome of the 
proceeding.  We therefore remand for the IJ to conduct a new 
hearing. 
 
1. Failure to conduct an adequate threshold 
inquiry into the need for an interpreter 
 
It is well established that the provision of an interpreter 
is a “minimum” requirement of a fair hearing for asylum 
applicants who have limited English proficiency; otherwise, an 
applicant’s “procedural rights would be meaningless in cases 
where the judge and . . . applicant cannot understand each 
other.”  Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 204 (3d Cir. 1996)6; 
see also, e.g., Perez-Lastor v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 773, 778 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (“It is long-settled that a competent translation is 
fundamental to a full and fair hearing. If a[] [noncitizen] does 
not speak English, deportation proceedings must be translated 
into a language the [noncitizen] understands.”); Augustin v. 
Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1984) (“A hearing is of no value 
when the [noncitizen] and the judge are not understood. . . . 
The very essence of due process is a ‘meaningful opportunity 
to be heard.’”) (citation omitted); Matter of Tomas, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 464, 465 (BIA 1987) (“The presence of a competent 
 
6 Marincas involved the requirements for a fair hearing under 
the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212 (1980), not the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  However, we 
made clear that those requirements are overlapping, because 
“fairness mandate[s] that the asylum procedure promulgated 
by the Attorney General [under the Refugee Act] provide the 
most basic of due process.”  92 F.3d at 203.  And “the most 
basic of due process,” in turn, requires the provision of an 
interpreter to a noncitizen who has limited English proficiency. 
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interpreter is important to the fundamental fairness of a 
hearing, if the [noncitizen] cannot speak English fluently.”). 
 
The Government does not dispute this requirement.  See 
Gov. Br. at 48–49 n.6 (“There is . . . no dispute that, of course, 
the agency has a duty to provide translation services in the 
absence of standard English proficiency.”); Oral Arg. Tr. at 
43:10–15 (Q: “I take it the government doesn’t dispute the 
notion that those who [have limited English proficiency], that 
due process requires that those types of aliens be provided an 
interpreter.” A: “Do not dispute that. Due process does require 
someone [who has limited English proficiency] to have an 
interpreter.”).  Nor does the Government dispute that as a 
practical matter, before an interpreter can be provided, there 
must “be some determination at the outset of a hearing whether 
an interpreter is required or not.”  Oral Arg. Tr. at 44:11–13.  
Instead, the parties disagree about what that determination 
must include to satisfy due process.  The Government argues 
that the procedures the IJ followed here—which included 
giving B.C. a binary choice between two languages and asking 
him if he was an “English speaker”—are sufficient.  B.C. 
contends that due process requires a more robust inquiry.  For 
the reasons discussed below, we agree with B.C. and hold that 
due process requires IJs to determine whether a noncitizen has 
a sufficient level of proficiency in “Standard” English to 
proceed without an interpreter.  This may begin by giving 
noncitizens a meaningful chance to express, on their own terms 
at the outset of a hearing, the languages in which they are 
sufficiently proficient. 
 
In analyzing due process claims, we turn to the three 
factors described decades ago in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 335 (1976): (1) the interest at stake for the individual 
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noncitizen; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) 
“the Government’s interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”  Id.  All three 
factors support B.C.’s claim that he was denied due process. 
 
The interests at stake for B.C. were considerable.  
“Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, 
it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of 
the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. . . . 
Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which 
he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of 
fairness.” 7  Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945). 
 
With respect to the second factor, there is an 
unacceptably high risk of erroneously depriving a noncitizen 
 
7 In the analogous criminal context, several of our sister circuits 
have held that judges have an affirmative duty to evaluate the 
need for an interpreter for an individual who has limited 
English proficiency.  See, e.g., Ramos-Martínez v. United 
States, 638 F.3d 315, 325 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Once the court is 
on notice that a defendant’s understanding of the proceedings 
may be inhibited by his limited proficiency in English, it has a 
duty to inquire whether he needs an interpreter.”); United 
States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1337 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he [Court Interpreters] Act places on the trial court a 
mandatory duty to inquire as to the need for an 
interpreter when a defendant has difficulty with English.”) 




of his liberty when an IJ does not properly assess whether he 
needs an interpreter.  “Immigration law is a field in which fair, 
accurate factfinding is of critical importance.”  Calderon-
Rosas v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 378, 381 (3d Cir. 2020).  When 
a noncitizen and an IJ cannot fully understand each other due 
to a language barrier, there is a significant risk that an IJ will 
make inaccurate factual or credibility findings that may cause 
the noncitizen to be deported unfairly.  Cf. Haitian Refugee 
Ctr., Inc. v. Nelson, 872 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(“The ability of the adjudicator . . . to make a reasonable 
assessment of the applicant’s credibility is obviously hampered 
by his inability to understand the applicant’s statements.”). 
 
The IJ’s approach to evaluating B.C.’s need for an 
interpreter enhanced the risk that he and B.C. would have 
difficulty understanding each other.  As we have previously 
explained, giving a noncitizen an “either-or” choice between 
two languages, based on the unfounded assumption that he 
must be proficient in at least one, is not an accurate method of 
determining which language(s) the noncitizen speaks 
proficiently.  See Senathirajah v. I.N.S., 157 F.3d 210, 218 (3d 
Cir. 1998).  Similarly, asking a noncitizen if he is an “English 
speaker” or an “Anglophone” is not a particularly helpful 
inquiry, as he might answer “yes” even if he understands 
“Standard” English only at a rudimentary level or speaks a 
variation of English that is not mutually intelligible to a 
“Standard” English speaker.  Given the “various degrees of 
proficiency one may have with a foreign language,” and the 
“difficulty someone from [another country] may have in 
understanding ‘American English,’ particularly under the 
stressful circumstances of entry into a new country,” “[i]t 
seems no stretch . . . to assume that [a noncitizen] might . . . 
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need[] an interpreter even if he technically ‘sp[eaks] the same 
language’ as the” immigration official.  Id. at 218 and n.10.   
 
It is also ineffective to presume that, because a 
noncitizen is able to respond to certain basic questions in 
“Standard” English, and even submitted written materials in 
that language, he must necessarily be a fluent “Standard” 
English speaker who does not need an interpreter.  A person 
who has limited “Standard” English proficiency “may be 
competent in certain types of [‘Standard’ English] 
communication . . . but still [have limited proficiency in 
‘Standard’ English] for other purposes.”  A.R. at 272–73.  With 
unlimited time and access to a bilingual dictionary, for 
example, a noncitizen who lacks proficiency in “Standard” 
English might be able to compose a reasonably coherent 
written statement in that language.  But that same individual 
might have trouble responding orally to rapid-fire questions in 
“Standard” English during a high-pressure hearing.   
 
There are other methods by which the IJ could have 
evaluated whether B.C.’s “Standard” English was deficient 
enough to warrant an interpreter.  The IJ could have begun by 
asking which languages he spoke and understood best or in 
which languages he was comfortable proceeding.  
Alternatively, the IJ could have asked an interpreter or a 
multilingual staff member to verify the languages in which 
B.C. was proficient.  The IJ could also have used a visual aid, 
like a card or poster showing the (translated) names of a variety 
of possible languages and asked B.C. to point to the relevant 
languages.  If B.C. had been accompanied by a relative or 
friend who spoke English well, the IJ could have asked that 
person about his language needs.  This list of possible 
approaches is non-exhaustive, and we do not prescribe any 
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script or checklist that must be followed in every case, nor do 
we suggest that any particular answer to these inquiries is 
dispositive of the need for an interpreter.  See Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible 
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.”).  But these methods share a common 
theme: giving the noncitizen the opportunity to communicate 
his language proficiency on his own terms.  And the IJ’s 
approach here did not give B.C. that opportunity. 
 
Additional safeguards would have significantly reduced 
the risk of erroneously depriving B.C. of his liberty.  If the IJ 
had simply asked him at the outset what languages he felt 
comfortable proceeding in, he might have responded that he 
was proficient in “Pidgin” English but not “Standard” English.  
This inquiry may have led the IJ to secure the relevant 
interpreter, which could have eliminated the possibility that 
B.C.’s testimony, and the IJ’s reaction to it, were colored by 
the language barrier. 
 
On the third factor, we do not underestimate the 
Government’s interest in the orderly administration of removal 
proceedings.  But conducting a meaningful threshold 
assessment of the need for an interpreter would facilitate, not 
threaten, that interest.  By engaging in a brief initial colloquy 
along the lines outlined above, the IJ in this case could have 
saved himself time and trouble.  For example, he could have 
forgone the lengthy, confusing discussion with B.C. at the 
conclusion of the hearing about why the latter struggled to 
express himself in “Standard” English.  See A.R. at 588–91. 
 
Failing to provide an interpreter when needed makes 
meaningless a noncitizen’s right to due process.  And not 
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making a threshold inquiry into whether an interpreter is 
needed, in turn, renders the right to an interpreter meaningless.  
Because the IJ did not make the proper inquiry here, the 
proceeding did not comply with due process.  
 
2. Failure to realize an interpreter was needed as 
the merits hearing continued 
 
A noncitizen’s due process rights do not end once his 
merits hearing has begun; rather, they continue “[t]hroughout 
all phases of [the] deportation proceeding[].”  Serrano-Alberto, 
859 F.3d at 213.  An IJ therefore has an ongoing obligation to 
offer an interpreter if it becomes readily apparent during a 
merits hearing that a noncitizen is having trouble speaking or 
understanding “Standard” English.  The Mathews factors 
discussed above apply with equal force in this context.  The 
Government argues the IJ complied with this requirement 
because “B.C. and the [IJ] had no trouble understanding each 
other.”  Gov. Suppl. Br. at 6.   
 
Substantial evidence does not support this conclusion.  
The hearing transcript reflects 36 separate instances in which 
B.C.’s testimony was “indiscernible.”  See, e.g., A.R. at 563 
(“[Government lawyer to B.C.]: Q. Sir, your mother is still 
alive. Is that right? Or is she deceased?  A. My mother is still 
alive.  Q. Okay. And how about your father?  A. He’s 
[indiscernible].  Q. I’m sorry.  A. [Indiscernible]. [Judge to 
B.C.]: Q. He’s what?  A. [Indiscernible].”).  On several 
occasions, B.C. initially gave non sequitur answers to 
questions that suggested he lacked a full understanding of what 
he was being asked.  See, e.g., A.R. at 544 (“Q. During that 
time period, did you go to the bathroom?  A. During that time, 
took everything out of my pockets.”); A.R. at 557 (“Q. How 
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did you get on the airplane? A. Cameroon. Q. How did you get 
on the airplane? A. I had [indiscernible].”).  He often 
responded to questions in fragments that make it difficult to 
ascertain what he was saying.  See, e.g., A.R. at 532 (“A. . . . . 
So there’s been an Anglophone did not accept Anglophones in 
Cameroon because they said the only way . . . .”); A.R. at 545 
(“Q. Was it just a coincidence that you were placed there? A. 
It’s not a coincidence. All the people, all the military people 
who [indiscernible] Anglophone.  We don’t have 
Anglophone.”).   
 
These issues should have led the IJ to realize that, 
despite his assumptions to the contrary, B.C. might have 
limited “Standard” English proficiency.  See Abulashvili, 663 
F.3d at 206 (“[T]he IJ should have realized that [the 
noncitizen’s] purported comprehension of English was not 
consistent with the difficulty he had in communicating, and 
that observation would have required neither familiarity with 
his language nor any particular expertise in communication 
theory.”).  Yet, instead of acknowledging the potential problem 
and seeking to remedy it, the IJ doubled down.  When B.C. 
appeared to be having trouble expressing himself, the IJ did not 
ask whether he needed an interpreter, but instead attributed the 
issue to B.C.’s “accent” and instructed him to “go slowly.”  
A.R. at 532.  And when B.C. eventually pointed out that his 
first language was “Pidgin” English, the IJ failed to understand 
the distinction between that language and “Standard” English, 
asking B.C. no less than three times why he would need to 
“practice” English if he grew up speaking it.  A.R. at 588–591.  
The IJ then asserted, with no apparent basis, that he himself 
“kn[ew] Pidgin English.”  A.R. at 589.  Because he ignored 
repeated signs that an interpreter might be needed, including 
B.C.’s own explanation of the difference between “Standard” 
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and “Pidgin” English, we cannot conclude that the IJ’s 
handling of the hearing comported with due process. 
 
To be clear, a few limited instances of communication 
difficulties are not enough, standing alone, to violate the 
process one is due.  Nor is the mere fact that a transcript 
contains certain “indiscernible” testimony sufficient on its own 
to establish a language barrier.  It is the unusually large amount 
of “indiscernible” testimony, coupled with other readily 
apparent indicia of misunderstandings, that convince us there 




In some cases, a due process issue may not warrant a 
remand to the agency where it is clear the noncitizen suffered 
no prejudice from the agency’s errors.  See Cham, 445 F.3d at 
694 (noting that, to establish a due process violation, a 
noncitizen must show “that the violation of a procedural 
protection . . . had the potential for affecting the outcome of 
[the] deportation proceedings”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted) (emphasis and alteration in original).  This is 
not such a case.  The IJ’s errors had the potential to affect the 
outcome of the proceedings in two ways.  First, as discussed 
above, the failure to evaluate B.C.’s need for an interpreter 
resulted in confusion and misunderstanding during the merits 
hearing.  And second, the IJ’s failure to recognize the language 
barrier may well have impermissibly colored his ultimate 
adverse credibility determination.   
 
The IJ found B.C. was not credible in part because he 
“appeared to have memorized his testimony,” which “seemed 
stilted, robotic, and unnatural,” and he became “flustered when 
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asked questions that caused him to deviate from his prepared 
statements.”  A.R. at 445.  The IJ was also troubled by what he 
believed to be “inconsistencies” between B.C.’s statements at 
various points in the proceedings, even though those 
statements were made without the benefit of an interpreter.   
 
“[T]he linguistic and cultural difficulties endemic in 
immigration hearings may frequently result in statements that 
appear to be inconsistent” or unnatural, “but in reality arise 
from a lack of proficiency in English or cultural differences 
rather than attempts to deceive.”  Abulashvili, 663 F.3d at 206.  
This is especially true when a pro se noncitizen with limited 
proficiency in “Standard” English is forced to proceed without 
an interpreter.  It is easy to imagine that a person in that 
position might attempt to rehearse or memorize certain 
portions of his testimony to compensate for his lack of comfort 
speaking off-the-cuff in “Standard” English and might seem 
“flustered” if asked to speak extemporaneously.  A noncitizen 
might appear especially uncomfortable where, as here, the IJ 
frequently interrupts him and admonishes that he sounds “bad” 
and “not . . . very natural.”  See, e.g., A.R. at 541, 549, 550, 
593.  A language barrier might also cause a noncitizen to testify 
less precisely and consistently than he otherwise would.  Cf. 
Balasubramanrim v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 157, 163–64 (3d Cir. 
1998) (rejecting adverse credibility determination based on 
purported inconsistencies between statements made during an 
asylum interview and a merits hearing because the noncitizen 
did not have the benefit of an interpreter during the interview). 
 
We sometimes remand immigration cases even absent a 
due process challenge when there are serious concerns that an 
unskilled interpreter has prejudiced a noncitizen.  See, e.g., 
Issiaka v. Att’y Gen., 569 F.3d 135, 143 (3d Cir. 2009); Kaita 
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v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 299–300 (3d Cir. 2008).  But the 
violation here is even more pronounced: we cannot assess the 
effect that any interpreter’s errors may have had on the 
outcome of the case because no interpreter was provided at any 
stage in the proceeding.  And instead of reaching the merits of 
B.C.’s arguments, the IJ rejected his claims solely on 
credibility grounds, which are uniquely susceptible to being 
influenced by a language barrier.8  Accordingly, we cannot 
avoid the conclusion that the IJ’s decision was shaped in part 
by the language issue.9  Hence we conclude a remand is 
appropriate and that B.C. “must be given a second, and a real, 
chance to create a record in a deportation hearing that comports 
 
8 B.C. represented during the hearing that he struggled to speak 
in “Standard” English during the asylum interview, but he tried 
to practice that language while in detention.  Even if B.C.’s 
“Standard” English had improved enough by the merits 
hearing that an interpreter was unnecessary, a remand would 
still be appropriate because the IJ failed to appreciate that 
“Standard” and “Pidgin” English are different languages, and 
proficiency in one does not necessarily confer proficiency in 
the other.  Due to this misunderstanding, the IJ relied on B.C.’s 
earlier testimony during the asylum interview as though it had 
been delivered by a native “Standard” English speaker when in 
fact it had not.  This may have colored the adverse credibility 
determination. 
9 B.C. argues that, under our precedent in Leslie v. Attorney 
General, 611 F.3d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 2010), he is entitled to an 
automatic remand due to the agency’s failure to comply with 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s language 
access plan.  Because B.C.’s petition succeeds on the ground 
outlined above, we need not reach this issue. 
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with the requirements of due process.”  Cham, 445 F.3d at 694 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).10 
 
B. Other Errors 
 
Because we conclude a remand for a new hearing is 
appropriate due to the language issue, we could stop there 
without further scrutinizing the IJ and BIA’s decisions.  
However, we briefly note other aspects of their approach that 
we find troubling and should be addressed on remand. 
 
1. Reliance on potentially unsupported 
“inconsistencies” 
 
As noted above, we cannot fully evaluate the IJ’s 
adverse credibility finding because it inextricably links to the 
language barrier.  But even if there were no language issue, at 
least some of the purported “inconsistencies” in B.C.’s 
testimony seem to lack record support for other reasons.  To be 
sure, “an adverse credibility determination can be based on 
inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and other factors, irrespective of 
 
10 B.C. also briefly asserts that the language issue violated his 
right to equal protection.  Because his discussion of the issue 
is so cursory, it is most likely forfeited.  Cf. Laborers’ Int’l 
Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 
398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it 
in its opening brief, and for those purposes a passing reference 
to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this 
court.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  But 
even if we can consider this argument, it is unpersuasive 
because B.C. does not claim any disparity in the availability of 
translators is due to discriminatory intent. 
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whether they go to the heart of an applicant’s claim,” 
Abulashvili, 663 F.3d at 202 n.7 (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)), and our review of that determination is 
deferential, id. at 205.  But this standard does not “permit a 
judge to cherry pick facts or inconsistencies to support an 
adverse credibility finding that is unsupported by the record as 
a whole.”  Ilunga v. Holder, 777 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
Several of the cited “inconsistent” statements may not 
in fact be inconsistent.  For example, the IJ faulted B.C. for 
giving the asylum officer at the credible fear interview one 
reason why he believed the government in Cameroon wanted 
to harm him but then giving another reason at his merits 
hearing.  In drawing this conclusion, the IJ treated the asylum 
officer’s typo-ridden notes as a complete and fully accurate 
representation of the credible fear interview, even though those 
notes state they “are not a verbatim transcript of this interview” 
and may exclude certain “areas of the individual’s claim.”  
A.R. at 833.  Even if the asylum officer’s notes accurately 
captured the nuance of B.C.’s answers, that B.C. gave a partial 
explanation of his experiences before the asylum officer, and 
then supplemented that explanation during the merits hearing, 
is not necessarily a sign of inconsistency.  Instead, it could 
reflect the different contexts of the credible fear interview and 
merits hearing: one is a brief, threshold undertaking, and the 
other is a lengthy proceeding in which a noncitizen is asked to 
respond to a series of highly specific questions.  On remand, 
the IJ should account for the context in which B.C. testified 





2. Ignoring corroborative evidence 
 
The IJ did not address documentary evidence that might 
have corroborated some of B.C.’s claims.  Specifically, B.C. 
submitted his brother’s Cameroonian death certificate, two 
letters from friends describing his brother’s death, and 
background information on country conditions in Cameroon.  
Although the IJ had previously acknowledged that the 
circumstances surrounding B.C.’s brother’s death were highly 
relevant to his claim, see A.R. at 499 (“[T]his [case] is likely 
going to rise or fall on credibility . . . [a]nd the death 
certificate.”), he inexplicably failed to discuss the substance of 
the death certificate at all in his opinion.  He similarly 
neglected to discuss the evidence of country conditions or 
letters corroborating the story of B.C.’s brother’s death beyond 
criticizing the letters for failing to include specific details about 
B.C.’s own activism in Cameroon.  The BIA was untroubled 
by these exclusions, stating in conclusory fashion that “all 
evidence not mentioned [by the IJ] was fully considered” and 
that, in any event, “the death certificate is insufficient to 
overcome . . .  [the] adverse credibility finding.”  A.R. at 343. 
 
“Although the BIA does not need to discuss every piece 
of evidence in the record, it may not ignore or misconstrue 
evidence in the asylum applicant’s favor.”  Tilija v. Att’y Gen., 
930 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The death certificate could have 
corroborated B.C.’s testimony about the circumstances of his 
brother’s death, which the IJ conceded was important.  Even if 
the IJ and BIA found that document unpersuasive, they should 
at least have explained their reasoning.  And if the IJ intended 
to fault B.C. for failing to obtain letters corroborating his 
political activism in Cameroon, he should have given B.C. 
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“notice [and] an opportunity to provide [that] evidence or 
explain its unavailability.”  Saravia v. Att’y Gen., 905 F.3d 
729, 738 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 
3. Faulting B.C. for not presenting a document 
withheld by the Government 
 
Finally, the IJ criticized B.C. for failing to “submit 
evidence of his membership” in two Cameroonian 
organizations—the SCNC and SDF.  A.R. at 444.  But the IJ 
never acknowledged that the reason B.C. lacked an SCNC 
membership card was because the Government confiscated it 
when he entered the United States and, despite multiple 
requests, did not return it until after his merits hearing had 
concluded.  To date, the Government has not provided an 
explanation for why the card was withheld.  Oral Arg. Tr. at 
45:18–20 (Government counsel: “I do not [know] why it took 
so long for them to produce the document . . .[,] just simply, it 
takes a while.”).  And the card was highly relevant to B.C.’s 
claims.  The IJ repeatedly acknowledged that members of the 
SCNC are persecuted in Cameroon and that a “true SCNC 
supporter[]” would be entitled to relief.  A.R. at 499, 595.  He 
doubted, however, that B.C. was a “true SCNC supporter[].”  
Id. at 595.  The card could have bolstered B.C.’s credibility on 
that issue.  On remand, the IJ should consider the card along 
with the other relevant evidence put in the record.11 
 
11 B.C. argues the BIA erred in denying his motion for 
reopening or reconsideration based in part on the submission 
of his SCNC membership card.  Because we remand to the IJ 
for a new hearing as outlined above, we need not separately 




*    *    *    *    * 
 
Due process requires that an interpreter be provided 
during removal proceedings to noncitizens who have limited 
proficiency in English.  Implicit in that requirement is a 
preliminary step: an IJ must meaningfully evaluate whether an 
interpreter is needed.  And because the right to an interpreter 
extends throughout the entire proceeding, an IJ has a 
continuing obligation to offer an interpreter if it appears a 
noncitizen is having significant trouble speaking or 
understanding “Standard” English.  The failure to take these 
steps, or to appreciate that a noncitizen has limited proficiency 
in “Standard” English, can impermissibly affect an IJ’s adverse 
credibility determination.  Because the IJ failed to satisfy these 
requirements in this case, which prejudiced B.C., we vacate the 
BIA’s decisions and remand for a new hearing. 
 
through the motion of the expert reports regarding “Pidgin” 
English and its speakers, coupled with B.C.’s own linguistic 
difficulties, it is surprising the BIA failed to recognize the 
extent to which “Standard” and “Pidgin” English differ. 
